Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. (Art. VII, 1987 Constitution) |
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Petitioner Bitonio was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the DOLE. DOLE Acting Secretary Brilliantes designated the Bitonio to be the DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of PEZA. As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, Bitonio was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997. After a post audit of the PEZA's disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per diems to the petitioner pursuant to the ruling in Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary where Executive Order No. 284 allowing government officials to hold multiple positions in government was declared unconstitutional. Thus, Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their Assistant Secretaries, are prohibited to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions and to receive compensation therefor, except in cases where the Constitution expressly provides. Bitonio filed an MR but the COA denied the same. Thus, he appealed to the SC.
The petitioner maintains that he is entitled to the payment of per diems, as R.A. No. 7916 specifically and categorically provides for the payment of a per diem for the attendance of the members of the Board of Directors at board meetings of PEZA. The petitioner contends that this law is presumed to be valid; unless and until the law is declared unconstitutional, it remains in effect and binding for all intents and purposes. Neither can this law be rendered nugatory on the basis of a mere memorandum circular COA Memorandum No. 97-038 issued by the COA. The petitioner stresses that R.A. No. 7916 is a statute more superior than an administrative directive and the former cannot just be repealed or amended by the latter.
He also posits that R.A. No. 7916 was enacted four (4) years after the case of Civil Liberties Union was promulgated. It is, therefore, assumed that the legislature, before enacting a law, was aware of the prior holdings of the courts. Since the constitutionality or the validity of R.A. No. 7916 was never challenged, the provision on the payment of per diems remains in force notwithstanding the Civil Liberties Union case. Nonetheless, the petitioner's position as Director IV is not included in the enumeration of officials prohibited to receive additional compensation as clarified in the Resolution of the Court dated August 1, 1991; thus, he is still entitled to receive the per diems.
Issue:
Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
Held:
1. Yes. The Secretary of Labor, who sits in an ex officio capacity as member of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), is prohibited from receiving any compensation for this additional office, because his services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It follows that the petitioner, who sits in the PEZA Board merely as representative of the Secretary of Labor, is likewise prohibited from receiving any compensation therefor. Otherwise, the representative would have a better right than his principal, and the fact that the petitioner’s position as Director IV of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) is not covered by the ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case is of no moment. After all, the petitioner attended the board meetings by the authority given to him by the Secretary of Labor to sit as his representative. If it were not for such designation, the petitioner would not have been in the Board at all.
There is also no merit in the allegation that the legislature was certainly aware of the parameters set by the Court when it enacted R.A. No. 7916, four (4) years after the finality of the Civil Liberties Union case. The payment of per diems was clearly an express grant in favor of the members of the Board of Directors which the petitioner is entitled to receive.
It is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the highest law of the land which is the Constitution. No law can render nugatory the Constitution because the Constitution is more superior to a statute. If a law happens to infringe upon or violate the fundamental law, courts of justice may step in to nullify its effectiveness. It is the task of the Court to see to it that the law must conform to the Constitution.
The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law which is the reason why the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748. Under the amended law, the members of the Board of Directors was increased from 8 to 13, specifying therein that it is the undersecretaries of the different Departments who should sit as board members of the PEZA. The option of designating his representative to the Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the last paragraph as to the payment of per diems to the members of the Board of Directors was also deleted, considering that such stipulation was clearly in conflict with the proscription set by the Constitution. (Bitonio vs. COA, G.R. No. 147392. March 12, 2004)
There is also no merit in the allegation that the legislature was certainly aware of the parameters set by the Court when it enacted R.A. No. 7916, four (4) years after the finality of the Civil Liberties Union case. The payment of per diems was clearly an express grant in favor of the members of the Board of Directors which the petitioner is entitled to receive.
It is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the highest law of the land which is the Constitution. No law can render nugatory the Constitution because the Constitution is more superior to a statute. If a law happens to infringe upon or violate the fundamental law, courts of justice may step in to nullify its effectiveness. It is the task of the Court to see to it that the law must conform to the Constitution.
The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law which is the reason why the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748. Under the amended law, the members of the Board of Directors was increased from 8 to 13, specifying therein that it is the undersecretaries of the different Departments who should sit as board members of the PEZA. The option of designating his representative to the Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the last paragraph as to the payment of per diems to the members of the Board of Directors was also deleted, considering that such stipulation was clearly in conflict with the proscription set by the Constitution. (Bitonio vs. COA, G.R. No. 147392. March 12, 2004)
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