Facts:

Buenaventura was married to Pascuala with whom he had six. Later on however, he started living with Carponia although he was still legally married to Pascuala and had not legally separated from her.

While living with Carponia, Buenaventura obtained an insurance policy from Insular Life Assurance Co. with a rider for accidental death benefit and designated Carponia as the revocable beneficiary, referring her therein as his wife. Barely more than a year after obtaining the policy, Buenaventura died when he was hit by a falling branch of a tree.

Carponia filed a claim for the proceeds of the Policy as the designated beneficiary therein, although she admits that she and the insured Buenaventura were merely living as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Pascuala also filed her claim as the widow of the deceased insured. She asserts that she is the one entitled to the insurance proceeds, not the common-law wife, Carponia. In view of the conflicting claims, Insular Life brought the matter to court interpleading both parties in the case. The trial court ruled in favor of Pascuala.


Issue:

Can a common-law wife named as beneficiary in the life insurance policy of a legally married man claim the proceeds thereof in case of death of the latter?


Held:

Yes. In essence, a life insurance policy is no different from a civil donation insofar as the beneficiary is concerned. Both are founded upon the same consideration: liberality. A beneficiary is like a donee, because from the premiums of the policy which the insured pays out of liberality, the beneficiary will receive the proceeds or profits of said insurance. As a consequence, the proscription in Article 739 of the new Civil Code should equally operate in life insurance contracts. The mandate of Article 2012 cannot be laid aside: any person who cannot receive a donation cannot be named as beneficiary in the life insurance policy of the person who cannot make the donation.

Policy considerations and dictates of morality rightly justify the institution of a barrier between common law spouses in regard to property relations since such relationship ultimately encroaches upon the nuptial and filial rights of the legitimate family. 

A conviction for adultery or concubinage is not necessary. Article 739 itself provides that the guilt of the donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action. In this case, the common law relationship is already admitted by Carponia herself in the stipulation of facts they submitted to the court. (Insular Life vs Ebrado, G.R. No. L-44059, October 28, 1977)