Facts:
Lucy filed a case for legal separation against Clemente on the ground of concubinage and an attempt by him against her life. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property, then under the administration and management of Clemente. Clemente opposed the motion based on Article 103 of the Civil Code which provides: "An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition” (now Art 58, Family Code). He manifested that if the motion were heard, the prospect of the reconciliation of the spouses would become even more dim. Judge Vamenta granted the motion of Clemente and suspended the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. Thus, Lucy filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Does the rule prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit?
Held:
No. Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period.
The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. That the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself is discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court." (now Art. 61, Family Code)
There would appear to be then a recognition that the question of management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There is justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him.
What was held by this Court in Araneta v. Concepcion, thus possesses relevance: It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article 105, Civil Code, now Art. 49, Family Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused. (Somosa-Ramos vs. Hon. Vamenta, G.R. No. L-34132, July 29, 1972)
The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. That the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself is discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court." (now Art. 61, Family Code)
There would appear to be then a recognition that the question of management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There is justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him.
What was held by this Court in Araneta v. Concepcion, thus possesses relevance: It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article 105, Civil Code, now Art. 49, Family Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused. (Somosa-Ramos vs. Hon. Vamenta, G.R. No. L-34132, July 29, 1972)
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