Article 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. - The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next proceeding article, shall contract marriage knowing that the requirements have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment.

If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by means of violence, intimidation or fraud, he shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty provided in the next preceding paragraph. (Revised Penal Code)


Elements:

1.) Offender contracted marriage;
2.) He knew at the time that –

        (a) The requirements of the law were not complied with; or
        (b) The marriage was in disregard of a legal impediment.

3. The offender must not be guilty of bigamy.


Notes:

● This article penalizes a person who shall contract marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or in disregard of a legal impediment.

● The crime is qualified when the consent of the other party was obtained by means of violence, intimidation or fraud.

● Conviction of a violation of art. 350 involves a crime of moral turpitude. (Villasanta v. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313)

● H is married to W. H contracts another marriage with C without a marriage license. Held: Crime committed is violation of Art. 350, not bigamy.

● Respondent judge knew that the solemnizing officer during her and her husband’s marriage in 1990 had no civil authority to solemnize marriages. It is clear from her Comment that she and her husband’s only consideration for their 1990 marriage was the recognition from the Roman Catholic Church. She stated that:

Fr. David Tither had no license to solemnize marriage from the National Archives or from the civil government. Hence, he was not under obligation to register our marriage. It was a purely sacramental marriage rite, without legal effect but definitely valid and recognized by the Roman Catholic Church. It is called "matrimoña de conciencia."

However, Article 350 may be of doubtful constitutionality when applied to religious exercise and expression insofar as it prescribes upon individuals and religious communities formal requirements for the conduct of their religious ceremonies. It puts a burden upon the exercise of beliefs by criminalizing marriages performed in accordance with those beliefs, but lacks some or all the requisites of a valid marriage under the law. These requirements include not only age and consent, but also formal requisites such as marriage license and civil authority of the solemnizing officer even though violence, fraud, or intimidation was not present under the circumstances. It may, therefore, limit religious exercise and expression to the formalities of law.

Thus, unless respondent judge’s act of participating in a marriage ceremony according to her religious beliefs violates other peoples’ rights or poses grave and imminent danger to the society,48 we cannot rule that respondent judge is administratively liable for her participation in her religious marriage ceremony.

In Estrada, this court ruled that in religious freedom cases, the test of benevolent neutrality should be applied. Under the test of benevolent neutrality, religious freedom is weighed against a compelling state interest:

Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

We find that there is no compelling state interest that may limit respondent judge’s right to participate in religious and merely ceremonial acts that are non-violative of other people’s rights and with no legally binding effect. The institution of marriage is not threatened when we accommodate respondent judge’s freedom to participate in such ceremonies even if they have secular counterparts under our laws. (Perfecto vs. Judge Esidera, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417, July 22, 2015)