Facts: 

Lupo Atienza was the President and General Manager of two corporations. He hired Yolanda de Castro as accountant for the said corporations. In the course of time, their relationship became intimate. In 1983, despite being a married man, Lupo and Yolanda lived together in consortium. However, after their second child was born, their relationship turned sour. 

In 1992, Lupo filed a complaint against Yolanda for the judicial partition of a parcel of land registered under the name of Yolanda, alleging they owned it in common under the concept of limited co-ownership. He alleged that Yolanda acquired the same using his exclusive funds. He did not interpose any objection to the registration because at the time, their affair was still thriving. Yolanda contended that she alone was the owner of the property as she acquired it thru her own savings as a businesswoman.

The trial court ruled in favor of Lupo by declaring the contested property as owned in common by him and Yolanda. The CA reversed the decision as Lupo failed to prove material contribution in the acquisition of the same.

Lupo appealed contending that he was not burdened to prove that he contributed in the acquisition of the property because with or without contribution he was deemed a co-owner, adding that under Article 484, NCC, for as long as they acquired the property during their extramarital union, such property would be legally owned by them in common and governed by the rule on co-ownership.


Issue: 

Who owns the subject property? Does Lupo need to prove that he contributed in the acquisition of the property?


Held: 

It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other because petitioner Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation with the respondent. Their property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ... Proof of actual contribution is required.

As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.

It is the petitioners posture that the respondent, having no financial capacity to acquire the property in question, merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two (2) corporations to raise the amount needed therefor.

In making proof of his case, it is paramount that the best and most complete evidence be formally entered. Rather than presenting proof of his actual contribution to the purchase money used as consideration for the disputed property, Lupo diverted the burden imposed upon him to Yolanda by painting her as a shrewd and scheming woman without the capacity to purchase any property. Instead of proving his ownership, or the extent thereof, over the subject property, Lupo relegated his complaint to a mere attack on the financial capacity of Yolanda. He presented documents pertaining to the ins and outs of the dollar accounts of ENRICO and EURASIAN, which unfortunately failed to prove his actual contribution in the purchase of the said property. The fact that Yolanda had a limited access to the funds of the said corporations and had repeatedly withdrawn money from their bank accounts for their behalf do not prove that the money she used in buying the disputed property, or any property for that matter, came from said withdrawals.

As we see it, petitioner's claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only did he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say so and voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly find no relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not evidence.
True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property covered thereby may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already stated, petitioner's evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial courts finding that the disputed property falls under the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to petitioners dismal failure to prove his cause, herein respondent was able to present preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, the respondent sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She presented her clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented her bank account statements and bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject property. (Atienza vs. De Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006)