The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until after disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. (Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution) |
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Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-In-Charge of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on the other hand, would appear to have had the support of then Representative Jose Yap of the Second Legislative District of Tarlac. Quiaoit emerged the victor when he was appointed by President Ramos to the coveted office. Quiaoit took his oath and assumed office. Bermudez refused to vacate. Nonetheless, Quiaoit, performed the duties and functions of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor.
Petitioner Bermudez filed a petition for prohibition and/or injunction, and mandamus, challenging the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Section 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code provides that “all provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary.”
Petitioner Bermudez filed a petition for prohibition and/or injunction, and mandamus, challenging the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Section 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code provides that “all provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary.”
Issue:
Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice can be held fatal to the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit.
Held:
When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should be here pertinent to state that the President is the head of government whose authority includes the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. Expressed in another way, the President has the power to assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau and office. It can accordingly be inferred therefrom that the President can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations.
The phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary, found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised Administrative Code, should be interpreted, as it is normally so understood, to be a mere advise, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. The President, being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus, or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority.
In the instant case, the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice and the appointment of the President are acts of the Executive Department itself, and there is no sharing of power to speak of, the latter being deemed for all intents and purposes as being merely an extension of the personality of the President. (Bermudez vs. Executive Secretary Torres, G.R. No. 131429. August 4, 1999)
When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should be here pertinent to state that the President is the head of government whose authority includes the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. Expressed in another way, the President has the power to assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau and office. It can accordingly be inferred therefrom that the President can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations.
The phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary, found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised Administrative Code, should be interpreted, as it is normally so understood, to be a mere advise, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. The President, being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus, or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority.
In the instant case, the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice and the appointment of the President are acts of the Executive Department itself, and there is no sharing of power to speak of, the latter being deemed for all intents and purposes as being merely an extension of the personality of the President. (Bermudez vs. Executive Secretary Torres, G.R. No. 131429. August 4, 1999)
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