■ Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. Such act or omission gives rise to an obligation which may come from law, contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts.

Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto; and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law; the intentional torts; and culpa aquiliana); or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action. Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender.

Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code. If, as here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee, subject to the employers defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. On the other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee.

Article 1161 of the Civil Code provides that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by penal laws subject to the provision of Article 2177 and of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages. Plainly, Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff may choose from in case the obligation has the possibility of arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from quasi-delict/tort. The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his initiatory pleading or complaint, and not with the defendant who can not ask for the dismissal of the plaintiffs cause of action or lack of it based on the defendants perception that the plaintiff should have opted to file a claim under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. (L.G. Foods Corporation vs. Pagapong-Agraviador, G.R. No. 158995, September 26, 2006) 


■The employer's primary liability under the Civil Code which is quasi-delictual or tortious in character  is governed by the following provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

 Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

 Art. 2180. The obligations imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
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 Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry,
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 The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (Sps. Franco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 71137, October 5, 1989)