The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (Sec. 12, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
|
|---|
Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City with station at Calamba on June 29, 1970. When he was about to perform his duties as a Judge, it was discovered that there was no space yet for him to facilitate his trials and no pieces of furniture and equipment necessary for him to conduct his duties. The local officials offered to furnish him the necessary place and facilities for his court but they failed to provide. Realizing that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave. The Secretary of Justice, however, persuade him to forego his leave and instead assist at the DOJ (Macaraig having served in the DOJ for 16 years), without being extended a formal detail, whenever he was not busy attending to the needs of his court.
Garcia filed an administrative against Macaraig for dishonesty, violation of his oath as a judge, and incomptence. He alleged that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as required by law and that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that he has not been performing the duties of a judge. Also questioned was the fact that a member of the judiciary is helping the DOJ, a department of the executive charge of prosecution of cases.
Issues:
Garcia filed an administrative against Macaraig for dishonesty, violation of his oath as a judge, and incomptence. He alleged that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as required by law and that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that he has not been performing the duties of a judge. Also questioned was the fact that a member of the judiciary is helping the DOJ, a department of the executive charge of prosecution of cases.
Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of dishonesty
2. Whether respondent judge is required to submit reports of accomplishments and status of cases in his sala
2. May judges be detailed to assist the DOJ Secretary in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts?
2. Whether respondent judge is required to submit reports of accomplishments and status of cases in his sala
2. May judges be detailed to assist the DOJ Secretary in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts?
Held:
1. No. After taking his oath and formally assuming this position as judge, respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary of a judge even in the extreme supposition that he did not perform any judicial function for he could, while preparing himself for his new job or for any good reason, take a leave, as in fact, he had planned to do, were it not for the request of the Secretary of Justice for him to forego the idea and, instead, help the Department in whatever way possible which would not, it must be presumed, impair his position as a judge. This is more so, when, as in this case, the government officials or officers in duty bound to furnish him the necessary place and facilities for his court and the performance of his functions have failed to provide him therewith without any fault on his part. That respondent took it upon himself to personally work for early action on the part of the corresponding officials in this direction and, in his spare time, made himself available to the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary, what with his vast experience, having worked therein for sixteen years, is, far from being dishonesty, to his credit. In the circumstances, it was certainly not improper that he rendered some kind of service to the government, since he was receiving salaries, while being unable to perform his regular duties as judge without any fault on, his part.
2. No. He has not yet started performing any judicial functions. None of those laws and circulars apply to him for all of them contemplate judges who are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions and others. On the other hand, respondent Could not be blamed for taking his oath as he did, for he had a valid confirmed appointment in his favor. In other words, he simply made himself available for the purpose for which he was appointed. That he could not actually hold office in the court to which he was appointed was not of his making.
3. No. This practice must be discontinued. The Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing to be sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, least the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts a check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. (Garcia vs. Macaraig, A.M. No. 198-J, May 31, 1971)
1. No. After taking his oath and formally assuming this position as judge, respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary of a judge even in the extreme supposition that he did not perform any judicial function for he could, while preparing himself for his new job or for any good reason, take a leave, as in fact, he had planned to do, were it not for the request of the Secretary of Justice for him to forego the idea and, instead, help the Department in whatever way possible which would not, it must be presumed, impair his position as a judge. This is more so, when, as in this case, the government officials or officers in duty bound to furnish him the necessary place and facilities for his court and the performance of his functions have failed to provide him therewith without any fault on his part. That respondent took it upon himself to personally work for early action on the part of the corresponding officials in this direction and, in his spare time, made himself available to the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary, what with his vast experience, having worked therein for sixteen years, is, far from being dishonesty, to his credit. In the circumstances, it was certainly not improper that he rendered some kind of service to the government, since he was receiving salaries, while being unable to perform his regular duties as judge without any fault on, his part.
2. No. He has not yet started performing any judicial functions. None of those laws and circulars apply to him for all of them contemplate judges who are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions and others. On the other hand, respondent Could not be blamed for taking his oath as he did, for he had a valid confirmed appointment in his favor. In other words, he simply made himself available for the purpose for which he was appointed. That he could not actually hold office in the court to which he was appointed was not of his making.
3. No. This practice must be discontinued. The Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing to be sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, least the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts a check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. (Garcia vs. Macaraig, A.M. No. 198-J, May 31, 1971)
0 Comments
Post a Comment