The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session. (Sec. 22, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
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Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security to shed light on the “Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan were directed by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not testify before said Committee. On the very day of the hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval. However, the two testified before the Senate, prompting Gen. Senga to issue an order directing Gudani and Balutan to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for investigation. The following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from military service. After investigation, the OPMG recommended that the two be charged with violation of Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer. Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo be declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges against them be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga and their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined from proceeding against them, as a consequence of their having testified before the Senate.
Issues:
1. May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry?
2. How may the members of the military be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise?
3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani considering his retirement last 4 October 2005?
1. May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry?
2. How may the members of the military be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise?
3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani considering his retirement last 4 October 2005?
Held:
1. Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
We ruled in Senate vs. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.
The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so. There is considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches, informed by due deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government.
3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4 October 2005. (Gudani vs. Senga, GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006)
1. Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
We ruled in Senate vs. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.
The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so. There is considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches, informed by due deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government.
3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4 October 2005. (Gudani vs. Senga, GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006)
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