Facts:
Virgilio and Dita were spouses. Their relationship turned bitter when Virgilio discovered that Dita had a paramour. Virgilio filed a case of adultery against Dita and her paramour. The two were convicted of the crime charged. Subsequently, Virgilio filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages before the RTC, imputing psychological incapacity on Dita. During the pre-trial, Virgilio and Dita entered into a Compromise Agreement wherein they agreed to partially separate their conjugal properties without prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage. The RTC approved the compromise agreement.
Virgilio, however, later filed an Omnibus Motion, praying for the repudiation of the Compromise Agreement and the reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement by the respondent judge on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the Compromise Agreement. The respondent Judge denied the motion.
Virgilio appealed, contending that the Compromise Agreement is void because it circumvents the law that prohibits the guilty spouse, who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the conjugal property. Since the respondent was convicted of adultery, the petitioner argues that her share should be forfeited in favor of the common child under Articles 43(2) and 63 of the Family Code.
To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to disqualify the spouse convicted of adultery from sharing in the conjugal property; and because the Compromise Agreement is void, it never became final and executory. Moreover, the petitioner cites Article 2035 of the Civil Code and argues that since adultery is a ground for legal separation, the Compromise Agreement is therefore void. He also argued that since the proceedings before the RTC were void in the absence of the participation of the provincial prosecutor or solicitor, the voluntary separation made during the pendency of the case is also void.
Virgilio, however, later filed an Omnibus Motion, praying for the repudiation of the Compromise Agreement and the reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement by the respondent judge on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the Compromise Agreement. The respondent Judge denied the motion.
Virgilio appealed, contending that the Compromise Agreement is void because it circumvents the law that prohibits the guilty spouse, who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the conjugal property. Since the respondent was convicted of adultery, the petitioner argues that her share should be forfeited in favor of the common child under Articles 43(2) and 63 of the Family Code.
To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to disqualify the spouse convicted of adultery from sharing in the conjugal property; and because the Compromise Agreement is void, it never became final and executory. Moreover, the petitioner cites Article 2035 of the Civil Code and argues that since adultery is a ground for legal separation, the Compromise Agreement is therefore void. He also argued that since the proceedings before the RTC were void in the absence of the participation of the provincial prosecutor or solicitor, the voluntary separation made during the pendency of the case is also void.
Issues:
1. Do Articles 43 and 63 of the Family code applies to the instant case?
2. Does Article 2035 of the Civil Code also apply to the instant case?
3. Does the Compromise Agreement circumvent the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties?
4. Does the absence of the public prosecutor nullify the compromise agreement?
2. Does Article 2035 of the Civil Code also apply to the instant case?
3. Does the Compromise Agreement circumvent the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties?
4. Does the absence of the public prosecutor nullify the compromise agreement?
5. May the compromise agreement be nullified on the ground that petitioner was not intelligently and judiciously informed by his counsel of the consequential effects of the agreement?
Held:
1. No. The foregoing provisions of the law are inapplicable to the instant case. Article 43 of the Family Code refers to a subsequent marriage that is terminated because of the reappearance of an absent spouse; while Article 63 applies to the effects of a decree of legal separation. The present case involves a proceeding where the nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared under the ground of psychological capacity.
2. Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement partially divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal with the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are expressly prohibited by Article 2035.
3. The contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending. However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code.
4. While the appearances of the Solicitor General and/or the Public Prosecutor are mandatory, the failure of the RTC to require their appearance does not per se nullify the Compromise Agreement. This Court fully concurs with the findings of the CA:
x x x. It bears emphasizing that the intendment of the law in requiring the presence of the Solicitor General and/or State prosecutor in all proceedings of legal separation and annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage is to curtail or prevent any possibility of collusion between the parties and to see to it that their evidence respecting the case is not fabricated. In the instant case, there is no exigency for the presence of the Solicitor General and/or the State prosecutor because as already stated, nothing in the subject compromise agreement touched into the very merits of the case of declaration of nullity of marriage for the court to be wary of any possible collusion between the parties. At the risk of being repetitive, the compromise agreement pertains merely to an agreement between the petitioner and the private respondent to separate their conjugal properties partially without prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage.
5. It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a lawyer within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of petitioners' counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against them. Exceptions to the foregoing have been recognized by the Court in cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when its application "results in the outright deprivation of one's property through a technicality." None of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the present case. (Maquilan vs. Maquilan, G.R. NO. 155409, June 8, 2007)
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