The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice- President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. (Sec. 4, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
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Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) was proclaimed President of the Philippines in the 2004 Elections. Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, FPJ, filed seasonably an election protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) in July 2004. However, on December 14, 2004, FPJ died. In January 2015, the widow of FPJ, Jesusa Sonora Poe (Susan Roces) filed a Manifestation with Urgent Petition/Motion to Intervene as a Substitute for Deceased Protestant FPJ. She claimed that because of the untimely demise of her husband and in representation not only of her deceased husband but more so because of the paramount interest of the Filipino people, there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband in the election protest initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the 2004 elections.
Issues:
1. Who may file an election protest before the PET?
2. May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latter's protest case?
2. May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latter's protest case?
Held:
1. Rule 14 of the PET Rules provides:
Rule 14. Election Protest. Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By this express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner had not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the candidate who received that 2nd or the 3rd highest number of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.
2. The PET does not have any rule on substitution nor intervention but it does allow for the analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of Court, decisions of the Supreme Court, and the decisions of the electoral tribunals.
Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court allows substitution by a legal representative. However, in applying this rule to an election contest, it has been ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, the substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests are denied since they are not the real parties in interest.
This is not to say that death of the protestant necessarily abates the pending action. While the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, we have allowed substitution and intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias and Lomugdang v. Javier, we permitted substitution by the vice-mayor since the vice-mayor is a real party in interest considering that if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice-mayor succeeds to the office of the mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly elected cannot assume office. In contrast, herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that protestants widow is not a real party in interest to this election protest.
Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on intervention in the absence of such a rule in the PET Rules. In such intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in the matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit from the outcome should it be determined that the declared president did not truly get the highest number of votes. We fully appreciate counsels manifestation that movant/intervenor herself claims she has no interest in assuming the position as she is aware that she cannot succeed to the presidency, having no legal right to it. Yet thus far, in this case, no real parties such as the vice-presidential aspirants in the 2004 elections, have come forward to intervene, or to be substituted for the deceased protestant. In our view, if persons not real parties in the action could be allowed to intervene, proceedings will be unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable and this is not the policy of the law. It is far more prudent to abide by the existing strict limitations on intervention and substitution under the law and the rules. (Poe vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005)
2. The PET does not have any rule on substitution nor intervention but it does allow for the analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of Court, decisions of the Supreme Court, and the decisions of the electoral tribunals.
Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court allows substitution by a legal representative. However, in applying this rule to an election contest, it has been ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, the substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests are denied since they are not the real parties in interest.
This is not to say that death of the protestant necessarily abates the pending action. While the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, we have allowed substitution and intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias and Lomugdang v. Javier, we permitted substitution by the vice-mayor since the vice-mayor is a real party in interest considering that if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice-mayor succeeds to the office of the mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly elected cannot assume office. In contrast, herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that protestants widow is not a real party in interest to this election protest.
Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on intervention in the absence of such a rule in the PET Rules. In such intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in the matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit from the outcome should it be determined that the declared president did not truly get the highest number of votes. We fully appreciate counsels manifestation that movant/intervenor herself claims she has no interest in assuming the position as she is aware that she cannot succeed to the presidency, having no legal right to it. Yet thus far, in this case, no real parties such as the vice-presidential aspirants in the 2004 elections, have come forward to intervene, or to be substituted for the deceased protestant. In our view, if persons not real parties in the action could be allowed to intervene, proceedings will be unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable and this is not the policy of the law. It is far more prudent to abide by the existing strict limitations on intervention and substitution under the law and the rules. (Poe vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005)
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