Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. (Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)

Forms of Executive Clemency

1. Reprieve - a postponement of a sentence to a date certain, or a stay in the execution.

2. Commutation - reduction or mitigation of the penalty.

3. Pardon - act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment which the law inflicts for the crime he has committed.

4. Remission of fines and forfeitures

5. Amnesty - Act of grace, concurred in by the legislature, usually extended to groups of persons who committed political offenses, which puts into oblivion the offense itself.


What are the limitations on the exercise of pardoning power?

1.  Cannot be granted in cases of impeachment;
2. Cannot be granted in violations of election laws without favorable recommendations of the Comelec;
3.  Can be granted only after conviction by final judgment (except amnesty);
4.  Cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt or civil contempt;
5.  Cannot absolve convict of civil liability including judicial costs;
6.  Cannot restore public offices forfeited.
7.  Amnesty can be granted only with the concurrence of majority of all members of Congress


What is the purpose for the grant of the power of executive clemency?

That Section 19 gives to the President the power of executive clemency is a tacit admission that human institutions are imperfect and that there are infirmities in the administration of justice. The power therefore exists as an instrument for correcting these infirmities and for mitigating whatever harshness might be generated by a too strict application of the law. In recent years, it has also been used as a bargaining chip in efforts to unify various political forces. [Bernas Primer at 320 (2006 ed.); Cruz, Philippine Political Law, p. 215 (1995 ed)]


May the pardoning power be controlled by the legislature or reversed by the courts?

Clemency is not a function of the judiciary; it is an executive function. The exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be controlled by the legislature or reversed by the courts, save only when it contravenes its limitations. [Bernas Commentary, p 892 (2003 ed); Cruz, Philippine Political Law, p. 215 (1995 ed)]


Can the President delegate his pardoning power?

There are powers vested in the President by the Constitution which may not be delegated to or exercised by an agent or alter ego of the President. Justice Laurel makes this clear:
 xxx. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy.
These distinctions hold true to this day. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import. (Constantino v. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005)
● Remission of fines and forfeitures merely prevents the collection of fines or the confiscation of forfeited property; it cannot have the effect of returning property which has been vested in third parties or money already in the public treasury. [Bernas Commentary, p 901 (2003 ed)]