Facts:
The spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima Barroso begot three children named Alejo, Eugenia and Marciana Lambino. In June 1919, said spouses made a donation of propter nuptias of the lands in favor of their son Alejo and Fortunata Solis in a private document in consideration of the marriage which the latter were about to enter into. One of the conditions of this donation is that in case of the death of one of the donees, one-half of these lands thus donated would revert to the donors while the surviving donee would retain the other half. Alejo and Fortunata were married and immediately thereafter the donors delivered the possession of the donated lands to them. In August 1919, Alejo died. Later, Juan also died. After the latter's death, his wife, Maxima Barroso, recovered possession of the donated lands.
Fortunata filed an action against Maxima and Eugenia and Marcelina, heirs of the deceased donor Juan, demanding the execution of the proper deed of donation according to law, transferring one-half of the donated property, and moreover, to proceed to the partition of the donated property and its fruits.
The court rendered judgment based upon article 1279 of the Civil Code granting Fortunata's prayer and ordering the defendants to execute a deed of donation in favor of Fortunata, adequate in form and substance to transfer to the latter the legal title to the part of the donated lands assigned to her in the original donation. It states in its judgment that the donation is onerous, and pursuant to article 622 of the Civil Code must be governed by the rules on contracts. It ruled that by the fact that this is a donation propter nuptias, it is based upon the marriage as a consideration, and must be considered onerous.
Fortunata filed an action against Maxima and Eugenia and Marcelina, heirs of the deceased donor Juan, demanding the execution of the proper deed of donation according to law, transferring one-half of the donated property, and moreover, to proceed to the partition of the donated property and its fruits.
The court rendered judgment based upon article 1279 of the Civil Code granting Fortunata's prayer and ordering the defendants to execute a deed of donation in favor of Fortunata, adequate in form and substance to transfer to the latter the legal title to the part of the donated lands assigned to her in the original donation. It states in its judgment that the donation is onerous, and pursuant to article 622 of the Civil Code must be governed by the rules on contracts. It ruled that by the fact that this is a donation propter nuptias, it is based upon the marriage as a consideration, and must be considered onerous.
Issues:
1. Was there a valid donation propter nuptias?
2. Are donations propter nuptias onerous?
2. Are donations propter nuptias onerous?
Held:
1. None. A donation propter nuptias, according to Article 1328 of the Civil Code, must be governed by the rules established in Title II, Book III of said Code (Articles 618-656). Article 633 provides that in order that a donation of real property may be valid it must be made in a public instrument. This is the article applicable to a donation propter nuptias in so far as its formal validity is concerned. The only exceptions to this rule are onerous and remuneratory donations, in so far as they do not exceed the value of the charge imposed, which are then governed by the rules on contracts (Art. 622), and those which are to take effect upon the donor's death, which are governed by the rules established for testamentary succession (Art. 620).
In the instant case the donation propter nuptias did not become valid neither did it create any right because it was not made in a public instrument; and Article 1279 of the Civil Code is not applicable. Article 1279 provides that, should the law require the execution of an instrument or any other special form in order to make the obligations of a contract effective, the contracting parties may compel each other to comply with such formality from the moment that consent has been given, and the other requirements for the validity of the contract exist. Suffice it to state that this article refers to contracts and is inapplicable to the donation in question which must be governed by the rules on donations. It may further be noted, at first sight, that this article presupposes the existence of a valid contract and cannot possibly refer to the form required in order to make it valid, which it already has, but rather to that required simply to make it effective, and for this reason, it would, at all events, be inapplicable to the donation in question, wherein the form is required precisely to make it valid.
2. In donations propter nuptias, the marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense of being necessary to give birth to the obligation. This may be clearly inferred from Article 1333, which makes the fact that the marriage did not take place a cause for the revocation of such donations, thus taking it for granted that there may be a valid donation propter nuptias, even without marriage, since that which has not existed cannot be revoked. And such a valid donation would be forever valid, even if the marriage never took place, if the proper action for revocation were not instituted, or if it were instituted after the lapse of the statutory period of prescription. This is, so because the marriage in a donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which, as such, presupposes the existence of the obligation which may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of the obligation. (Solis vs. Barroso, G.R. No. L-27939, October 30, 1928)
In the instant case the donation propter nuptias did not become valid neither did it create any right because it was not made in a public instrument; and Article 1279 of the Civil Code is not applicable. Article 1279 provides that, should the law require the execution of an instrument or any other special form in order to make the obligations of a contract effective, the contracting parties may compel each other to comply with such formality from the moment that consent has been given, and the other requirements for the validity of the contract exist. Suffice it to state that this article refers to contracts and is inapplicable to the donation in question which must be governed by the rules on donations. It may further be noted, at first sight, that this article presupposes the existence of a valid contract and cannot possibly refer to the form required in order to make it valid, which it already has, but rather to that required simply to make it effective, and for this reason, it would, at all events, be inapplicable to the donation in question, wherein the form is required precisely to make it valid.
2. In donations propter nuptias, the marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense of being necessary to give birth to the obligation. This may be clearly inferred from Article 1333, which makes the fact that the marriage did not take place a cause for the revocation of such donations, thus taking it for granted that there may be a valid donation propter nuptias, even without marriage, since that which has not existed cannot be revoked. And such a valid donation would be forever valid, even if the marriage never took place, if the proper action for revocation were not instituted, or if it were instituted after the lapse of the statutory period of prescription. This is, so because the marriage in a donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which, as such, presupposes the existence of the obligation which may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of the obligation. (Solis vs. Barroso, G.R. No. L-27939, October 30, 1928)
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