Self-defense and fulfillment of duty operate on different principles. Self-defense is based on the principle of self-preservation from mortal harm, while fulfillment of duty is premised on the due performance of duty. The difference between the two justifying circumstances is clear, as the requisites of self-defense and fulfillment of duty are different.

The elements of self-defense are as follows:

a) Unlawful Aggression;

b) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

c) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

On the other hand, the requisites of fulfillment of duty are:
  1. The accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office;
  2. The injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
A policeman in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm. In case injury or death results from the policeman’s exercise of such force, the policeman could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing the death of the offender if the policeman had used necessary force. Since a policeman’s duty requires him to overcome the offender, the force exerted by the policeman may therefore differ from that which ordinarily may be offered in self-defense. However, a policeman is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating the offender with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be affected otherwise.

Unlike in self-defense where unlawful aggression is an element, in performance of duty, unlawful aggression from the victim is not a requisite. In People v. Delima, a policeman was looking for a fugitive who had several days earlier escaped from prison. When the policeman found the fugitive, the fugitive was armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance. The policeman demanded the surrender of the fugitive. The fugitive lunged at the policeman with his bamboo lance. The policeman dodged the lance and fired his revolver at the fugitive. The policeman missed. The fugitive ran away still holding the bamboo lance. The policeman pursued the fugitive and again fired his revolver, hitting and killing the fugitive. The Court acquitted the policeman on the ground that the killing was done in the fulfillment of duty.

The fugitive’s unlawful aggression in People v. Delima had already ceased when the policeman killed him. The fugitive was running away from the policeman when he was shot. If the policeman were a private person, not in the performance of duty, there would be no self-defense because there would be no unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased. It may even appear that the public officer acting in the fulfillment of duty is the aggressor, but his aggression is not unlawful, it being necessary to fulfill his duty.

While self-defense and performance of duty are two distinct justifying circumstances, self-defense or defense of a stranger may still be relevant even if the proper justifying circumstance in a given case is fulfillment of duty. For example, a policeman’s use of what appears to be excessive force could be justified if there was imminent danger to the policeman’s life or to that of a stranger. If the policeman used force to protect his life or that of a stranger, then the defense of fulfillment of duty would be complete, the second requisite being present.

In People v. Lagata, a jail guard shot to death a prisoner whom he thought was attempting to escape. The Court convicted the jail guard of homicide because the facts showed that the prisoner was not at all trying to escape. The Court declared that the jail guard could only fire at the prisoner in self-defense or if absolutely necessary to avoid the prisoner’s escape.

In this case, Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban were in the performance of duty as policemen when they escorted Valino, an arrested robber, to retrieve some stolen items. We uphold the finding of the Sandiganbayan that there is no evidence that the policemen conspired to kill or summarily execute Valino. In fact, it was not Valino who was supposed to go with the policemen in the retrieval operations but his two other cohorts, Magat and Reyes. Had the policemen staged the escape to justify the killing of Valino, the M16 Armalite taken by Valino would not have been loaded with bullets. Moreover, the alleged summary execution of Valino must be based on evidence and not on hearsay.

Undoubtedly, the policemen were in the legitimate performance of their duty when Cabanlig shot Valino. Thus, fulfillment of duty is the justifying circumstance that is applicable to this case. To determine if this defense is complete, we have to examine if Cabanlig used necessary force to prevent Valino from escaping and in protecting himself and his co-accused policemen from imminent danger.

Fulfillment of Duty was Complete, Killing was Justified

The Sandiganbayan convicted Cabanlig because his defense of fulfillment of duty was found to be incomplete. The Sandiganbayan believed that Cabanlig "exceeded the fulfillment of his duty when he immediately shot Valino without issuing a warning so that the latter would stop."

We disagree with the Sandiganbayan.

Certainly, an M16 Armalite is a far more powerful and deadly weapon than the bamboo lance that the fugitive had run away with in People v. Delima. The policeman in People v. Delima was held to have been justified in shooting to death the escaping fugitive because the policeman was merely performing his duty.

In this case, Valino was committing an offense in the presence of the policemen when Valino grabbed the M16 Armalite from Mercado and jumped from the jeep to escape. The policemen would have been justified in shooting Valino if the use of force was absolutely necessary to prevent his escape. But Valino was not only an escaping detainee. Valino had also stolen the M16 Armalite of a policeman. The policemen had the duty not only to recapture Valino but also to recover the loose firearm. By grabbing Mercado’s M16 Armalite, which is a formidable firearm, Valino had placed the lives of the policemen in grave danger.

Had Cabanlig failed to shoot Valino immediately, the policemen would have been sitting ducks. All of the policemen were still inside the jeep when Valino suddenly grabbed the M16 Armalite. Cabanlig, Mercado and Esteban were hemmed in inside the main body of the jeep, in the direct line of fire had Valino used the M16 Armalite. There would have been no way for Cabanlig, Mercado and Esteban to secure their safety, as there were no doors on the sides of the jeep. The only way out of the jeep was from its rear from which Valino had jumped. Abesamis and Padilla who were in the driver’s compartment were not aware that Valino had grabbed Mercado’s M16 Armalite. Abesamis and Padilla would have been unprepared for Valino’s attack.

By suddenly grabbing the M16 Armalite from his unsuspecting police guard, Valino certainly did not intend merely to escape and run away as far and fast as possible from the policemen. Valino did not have to grab the M16 Armalite if his sole intention was only to flee from the policemen. If he had no intention to engage the policemen in a firefight, Valino could simply have jumped from the jeep without grabbing the M16 Armalite. Valino’s chances of escaping unhurt would have been far better had he not grabbed the M16 Armalite which only provoked the policemen to recapture him and recover the M16 Armalite with greater vigor. Valino’s act of grabbing the M16 Armalite clearly showed a hostile intention and even constituted unlawful aggression.

Facing imminent danger, the policemen had to act swiftly. Time was of the essence. It would have been foolhardy for the policemen to assume that Valino grabbed the M16 Armalite merely as a souvenir of a successful escape. As we have pointed out in Pomoy v. People:

Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer of the law, petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself.

The Sandiganbayan, however, ruled that despite Valino’s possession of a deadly firearm, Cabanlig had no right to shoot Valino without giving Valino the opportunity to surrender. The Sandiganbayan pointed out that under the General Rules of Engagement, the use of force should be applied only as a last resort when all other peaceful and non-violent means have been exhausted. The Sandiganbayan held that only such necessary and reasonable force should be applied as would be sufficient to conduct self-defense of a stranger, to subdue the clear and imminent danger posed, or to overcome resistance put up by an offender.

The Sandiganbayan had very good reasons in steadfastly adhering to the policy that a law enforcer must first issue a warning before he could use force against an offender. A law enforcer’s overzealous performance of his duty could violate the rights of a citizen and worse cost the citizen’s life. We have always maintained that the judgment and discretion of public officers, in the performance of their duties, must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within the limits of the law.24 The issuance of a warning before a law enforcer could use force would prevent unnecessary bloodshed. Thus, whenever possible, a law enforcer should employ force only as a last resort and only after issuing a warning.

However, the duty to issue a warning is not absolutely mandated at all times and at all cost, to the detriment of the life of law enforcers. The directive to issue a warning contemplates a situation where several options are still available to the law enforcers. In exceptional circumstances such as this case, where the threat to the life of a law enforcer is already imminent, and there is no other option but to use force to subdue the offender, the law enforcer’s failure to issue a warning is excusable.

In this case, the embattled policemen did not have the luxury of time. Neither did they have much choice. Cabanlig’s shooting of Valino was an immediate and spontaneous reaction to imminent danger. The weapon grabbed by Valino was not just any firearm. It was an M16 Armalite (Cabanlig v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. NO. 148431 July 28, 2005).