Art. 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. — Any person who shall knowingly and falsely represent himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or who, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. (Revised Penal Code)


Acts punished:

1. Usurpation of authority - committed when a person knowingly and falsely represents himself as officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government. (E.g. pretending to be a fire inspector officer who goes around inspecting business establishments)

2. Usurpation of official functions - committed when a person performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, under pretense of official position, without being lawfully entitled to do so


■  There are two ways of committing the crime of usurpation of authority or official functions. First is by pretending to be an officer of the government and the second one is by performing acts of a person in authority or public officer under the pretense of such authority despite being unauthorized to do so.


■ In usurpation of authority, the mere act of knowingly and falsely representing oneself  is sufficient. It is not necessary that he performs an act pertaining to a public officer. In usurpation of official functions, it is essential that the offender should have performed an act pertaining to a person in authority.


■  False representation may be shown by acts. 


■  A public officer may also be an offender. There is actually no reason to restrict the operation of Article 177 to private individuals. For one thing it applies to “any person”; and where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. (People vs. Hilvano, G.R. No. L-8583, July 31, 1956)



■  Under Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code, in order for one to be held liable for Usurpation of Official Function, there must be a clear showing that the person being charged had performed an act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine government or any agency thereof, under pretense of official position, and without being lawfully entitled to do so.

In this instant case, respondent Hefti was the one specifically charged with Usurpation of Official Function, in view of her act of issuing the notice of constructive distraint against the foreign currency deposit of complainant with the Citibank. The rest of the public respondents and all the private respondents were merely charged in conspiracy with the said respondent. Hence, the issue that must be resolved is whether or not respondent Hefti being the Deputy Commissioner of BIR had indeed usurped the duty of the BIR Commissioner when she issued the notice of distraint.

While it is true that under Sec. 206 of the NIRC as amended, the Commissioner of the BIR and not any Officer of the BIR was the one granted with the power to issue a notice of distraint, it bears to stress, however, that when respondent Hefti exercised such function of the BIR Commissioner, she was then designated Officer-In-Charge of the BIR by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, as evidenced by a photocopy of her Memorandum of Appointment dated January 23, 2001. By virtue of her appointment as Officer-In-Charge of BIR, it necessary follows that respondent Hefti can now legally exercise the duties and functions pertaining to the BIR Commissioner, including the issuance of a constructive distraint. Whether the issuance of the notice of distraint is valid or not, such issue is no longer within the power of this Office to decide inasmuch as the power to review the decision of the BIR Commissioner on matters of distraint lies within the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. Suffice it to say that when respondent Hefti issued the notice of distraint, she was clothed with authority to issue the same in view of her appointment as the then Officer-In-Charge of the BIR. Hence, the charge for Usurpation of Official Function does not apply to said respondent.

With the establishment of respondent Heftis authority in the issuance of the constructive distraint, the subsequent act of respondent Dagdag in serving the said distraint to the Citibank, as well as the act of respondents Equillos and Albiento in witnessing the service of the same to the said bank, can not be construed as act in agreement to commit the crime of Usurpation of Authority in the light of the foregoing discussion. (Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 156160, December 9, 2004)