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In 1983, Monsanto (then assistant city treasurer of Calbayog City) was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of estafa thru falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50. The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, clemency could be given even before conviction).
On the strength of such pardon, she wrote the City Treasurer of Calbayog asking for automatic reinstatement to her position without need of a new appointment since it was still vacant. The letter was referred to the Ministry of Finance (MF) which at that time had control over the City Treasuries. The Ministry of Finance ruled in favor of Monsanto but said that appointment was only to retroact from the date of she was given pardon. Monsanto asked for reconsideration saying that the full pardon wiped out the crime and thus her service in the government should not be considered to have interrupted. Thus, the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.
The motion for reconsideration was referred to the Office of the President. Executive Secretary Factoran reversed the ruling of MF, ruling that acquittal and not pardon is the only ground for reinstatement in the public service and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite.
Monsanto thus filed a petition before the SC. She contends that since the pardon was given when her case was still pending on appeal before the SC, no final verdict has yet been handed and consequently the accessory penalty attached to the crime which is forfeiture from public office did not attached. Also she contends that the pardon given before the final verdict is tantamount to acquittal.
Issues:
On the strength of such pardon, she wrote the City Treasurer of Calbayog asking for automatic reinstatement to her position without need of a new appointment since it was still vacant. The letter was referred to the Ministry of Finance (MF) which at that time had control over the City Treasuries. The Ministry of Finance ruled in favor of Monsanto but said that appointment was only to retroact from the date of she was given pardon. Monsanto asked for reconsideration saying that the full pardon wiped out the crime and thus her service in the government should not be considered to have interrupted. Thus, the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.
The motion for reconsideration was referred to the Office of the President. Executive Secretary Factoran reversed the ruling of MF, ruling that acquittal and not pardon is the only ground for reinstatement in the public service and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite.
Monsanto thus filed a petition before the SC. She contends that since the pardon was given when her case was still pending on appeal before the SC, no final verdict has yet been handed and consequently the accessory penalty attached to the crime which is forfeiture from public office did not attached. Also she contends that the pardon given before the final verdict is tantamount to acquittal.
Issues:
1. What is the effect of absolute pardon?
2. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?
3. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment?
4. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence?
2. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?
3. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment?
4. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence?
Held:
1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.
While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
2. No. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.”
3. No. Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
4. No. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation. (Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989)
Note: Conviction by final judgment is now necessary before parole or pardon could be extended. (Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, People vs. Casido; People vs. Salle)
1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.
While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
2. No. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.”
3. No. Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
4. No. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation. (Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989)
Note: Conviction by final judgment is now necessary before parole or pardon could be extended. (Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, People vs. Casido; People vs. Salle)
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