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Governor Ocampo of Tarlac was found guilty of graft and corruption. He was suspended for office for 90 days; hence his vice-governor, Llamas, assumed office. Less than two months, however, Executive Secretary Orbos, without ruling on Ocampo's Motion for Reconsideration, issued a Resolution granting executive clemency. Thus, Ocampo re-assumed the governorship of the province.
Llamas filed a petition questioning said Resolution. He contends that executive clemency could be granted by the President only in criminal cases as there is nothing in the statute books or even in the Constitution which allows the grant thereof in administrative cases. According to the him, the qualifying phrase "after conviction by final judgment" in Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution applies solely to criminal cases. He also contends that the pardon granted was premature since Ocampo's motion for reconsideration has abated the running of the reglementary period for finality of judgment and that his constitutional rights to due process were violated since he was not notified of the pardon.
Llamas filed a petition questioning said Resolution. He contends that executive clemency could be granted by the President only in criminal cases as there is nothing in the statute books or even in the Constitution which allows the grant thereof in administrative cases. According to the him, the qualifying phrase "after conviction by final judgment" in Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution applies solely to criminal cases. He also contends that the pardon granted was premature since Ocampo's motion for reconsideration has abated the running of the reglementary period for finality of judgment and that his constitutional rights to due process were violated since he was not notified of the pardon.
Issues:
1. May the president grant executive clemency in administrative cases?
2. Has there been a final judgment?
3. Was petitioner's constitutional rights to due process violated when he was not notified of the pardon?
2. Has there been a final judgment?
3. Was petitioner's constitutional rights to due process violated when he was not notified of the pardon?
Held:
1. Yes. The president can grant executive clemency based in Art. VII sec. 19 of the constitution. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. If the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish. If executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
Also a number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize the exercise of executive clemency in administrative cases. One example of which is Sec. 43 of PD 807 which provides that in meritorious cases, the president may commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities issued upon officers and employees in disciplinary cases. Moreover, the intent of the constitutional commission is to give the president the power to grant executive clemency and is not to be limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided in the constitution.
2. Yes. There has been a final judgment because upon acceptance of the presidential pardon, the grantee is deemed to have waived any appeal which he may have filed. Consequently, Ocampo's acceptance of the presidential pardon "serves to put an end" to the motion for reconsideration and renders the subject decision final.
Note: Conviction by final judgment is now necessary before parole or pardon could be extended. (Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, People vs. Casido; People vs. Salle)
3. No. Pardon has been defined as "the private, though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the court. Thus, assuming that petitioner was not notified of the subject pardon, it is only because said notice is unnecessary. (Llamas vs. Executive Secretary Orbos, G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991)
1. Yes. The president can grant executive clemency based in Art. VII sec. 19 of the constitution. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. If the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish. If executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
Also a number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize the exercise of executive clemency in administrative cases. One example of which is Sec. 43 of PD 807 which provides that in meritorious cases, the president may commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities issued upon officers and employees in disciplinary cases. Moreover, the intent of the constitutional commission is to give the president the power to grant executive clemency and is not to be limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided in the constitution.
There is no reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. If the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.
2. Yes. There has been a final judgment because upon acceptance of the presidential pardon, the grantee is deemed to have waived any appeal which he may have filed. Consequently, Ocampo's acceptance of the presidential pardon "serves to put an end" to the motion for reconsideration and renders the subject decision final.
Note: Conviction by final judgment is now necessary before parole or pardon could be extended. (Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, People vs. Casido; People vs. Salle)
3. No. Pardon has been defined as "the private, though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the court. Thus, assuming that petitioner was not notified of the subject pardon, it is only because said notice is unnecessary. (Llamas vs. Executive Secretary Orbos, G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991)
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