Facts: 

In 1998, respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote (guardian ad litem) filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni Nadores Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. The petition alleged that: Giovanni is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso; he was born on July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code; his mother made him use the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them; from the time Giovanni was born and up to the present, his father failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns; Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mother’s surname; Giovanni’s mother might eventually petition him to join her in the United States and his continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his natural father, may complicate his status as natural child; and the change of name will be for the benefit of the minor.

The trial court gave due course to the petition. Publication of the petition was ordered and the local civil registrar and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was notified. Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex-parte before a court-appointed commissioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court granted the motion. After the reception of evidence, the trial court granted the petition.

The OSG appealed arguing that the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding. The CA, however, affirmed the decision. 

Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable parties. The purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by the child’s change of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial. 


Issues: 

1. Whether or not the petition for change of name should be granted.

2. Is a proceeding for change of name adversarial?

3. Did Capote comply with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding?

4. When is a proceeding considered adversarial?


Held:

1. Yes. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. Under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.

2. The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or typographical errors. The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry, although by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding change in the entry is also required to reflect the change in name. 

3. Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected to exercise its judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG neither opposed the petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were not adversarial enough.

4. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition (Republic of the Philippines vs Trinidad R. A. Capote, G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007).