Facts:
In 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging that they were married civilly on September 21, 1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired properties during their marriage; and, that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok in 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
In his Answer, Eufemio counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok. In 1969, during the pendency of the case, Carmen died in a vehicular accident. Eufemio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the death abated the action for legal separation.
Carmen's counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion. The trial court dismissed the case.
In his Answer, Eufemio counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok. In 1969, during the pendency of the case, Carmen died in a vehicular accident. Eufemio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the death abated the action for legal separation.
Carmen's counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion. The trial court dismissed the case.
Issues:
1.) Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action?
2.) If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?
2.) If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?
Held:
1.) An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100 (Art. 56, FC), by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108 (Art. 66, FC), by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur cum persona.
.. When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during the course of the suit. The action is absolutely dead (Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933, 332.")
2.) Yes. A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree.
.. When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during the course of the suit. The action is absolutely dead (Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933, 332.")
2.) Yes. A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree.
From Article 106 (Art. 63, FC) it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of the deceased party.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn. (Lapuz Sy vs. Eufemio, G.R. No. L-30977, January 31, 1972)
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn. (Lapuz Sy vs. Eufemio, G.R. No. L-30977, January 31, 1972)
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