Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. (Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
A final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. The grant of pardon, the determination of the terms and conditions of the pardon, the determination of the occurrence of the breach thereof, and the proper sanctions for such breach, are purely executive acts and, thus, are not subject to judicial scrutiny. 


Facts: 

Torres was convicted two counts of estafa. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. In 1979, he was granted a conditional pardon by the President on condition he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." Torres accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. In 1986, upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the President cancelled the conditional pardon because Torres had been charged with 20 of estafa and convicted of sedition.

The wife and children of Torres filed before the SC a petition for habeas corpus praying for the immediate release of Torres from prison on the ground that the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in violation of pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.


Issues:

1. Is a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee a requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon?

2. May habeas corpus be resorted to by Torres?


Held:

1. No. Where a conditional pardonee has allegedly breached a condition of a pardon, the President who opts to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code need not wait for a judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime or for his conviction therefor by final judgment, in order to effectuate the recommitment of the pardonee to prison. The grant of pardon, the determination of the terms and conditions of the pardon, the determination of the occurrence of the breach thereof, and the proper sanctions for such breach, are purely executive acts and, thus, are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. By the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon.

The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.


2. No. Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000. (In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. Torres, G.R. No. 122338, December 29, 1995)