Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. (Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution) |
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In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights.
In 2009, Estrada run for President. None of the disqualification cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena and run for the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC) in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. She also contends that the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," makes the pardon conditional.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
Issues:
1. May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office?
2. May the pardoning power of the President be limited by legislative action?
3. Did the third preambular clause of the pardon operate to make the pardon conditional?
In 2009, Estrada run for President. None of the disqualification cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena and run for the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC) in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. She also contends that the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," makes the pardon conditional.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
Issues:
1. May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office?
2. May the pardoning power of the President be limited by legislative action?
3. Did the third preambular clause of the pardon operate to make the pardon conditional?
Held:
3. No. Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfillment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended to former President Estrada. (Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)
1. Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Likewise, while Section 40 of the LGC disqualifies "those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence" to run for any elective local position, Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.
2. No. It is apparent from Section 19, Article VII and Section 5, Article IX-C of the 1987 Consitution that the only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.
3. No. Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfillment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended to former President Estrada. (Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)
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