Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. (Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution) |
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Santos was convicted of estafa and was sentenced to six months of imprisonment. Notwithstanding his conviction, he continued to be a registered elector and was even seated as the municipal president of Malabon. In 1938, the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357) was passed, sec. 94 (b) of which disqualifies Santos from voting for having been declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property. Because of this, Santos applied for absolute pardon with the President. This was granted and he was restored to his full and civil political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility.
Petitioner Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of Santos from the list of voters on the ground that he was disqualified under the Election Code. The trial court denied; hence, Cristobal filed a petition for certiorari. Cristobal contends that the pardon granted by the President did not restore Santos to the full enjoyment of his political rights because: a) the pardoning power does not apply to legislative prohibitions; b) the pardoning power would amount to an unlawful exercise by the President of a legislative function, and c) Santos having served his sentence and all accessory penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon.
Petitioner Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of Santos from the list of voters on the ground that he was disqualified under the Election Code. The trial court denied; hence, Cristobal filed a petition for certiorari. Cristobal contends that the pardon granted by the President did not restore Santos to the full enjoyment of his political rights because: a) the pardoning power does not apply to legislative prohibitions; b) the pardoning power would amount to an unlawful exercise by the President of a legislative function, and c) Santos having served his sentence and all accessory penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon.
Issue:
Whether the presidential power of pardon applies to legislative prohibitions
Held:
There are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted.
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.
In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights."
The suggestion that the disqualification imposed in paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357, does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, not contemplated in the Constitution, and would lead furthermore to the result that there would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative action. (Labrador vs. Cristobal, G.R. No. 47941. December 7, 1940)
There are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted.
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.
In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights."
The suggestion that the disqualification imposed in paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357, does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, not contemplated in the Constitution, and would lead furthermore to the result that there would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative action. (Labrador vs. Cristobal, G.R. No. 47941. December 7, 1940)
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