Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. (Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)

Facts: 

Casido and Alcorin were members of the CPP/NPA. In 1993, they were convicted of murder. In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, they applied for pardon as well as for amnesty, both of which were granted during the pendency of their appeal.


Issues:

1. Was the pardon granted during the pendency of the appeal valid?

2. Was the amnesty during the pendency of the appeal valid ?


Held:

1. No. The pardon was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. As early as 1991, this Court, in People v. Sepada, the court already stressed in no uncertain terms the necessity of a final judgment before parole or pardon could be extended.


2. Yes. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. The grant of amnesty, for which accused-appellants voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress. (Sales vs. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-3972. October 13, 1950)