Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. (Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution) |
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Fidel Ariston had been convicted of the crime of frustrated murder. After serving a little more than two years of his sentence, he was given a conditional pardon by the President, "the condition being that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines and that, should this condition be violated, he shall be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." Eight years after the grant of his conditional pardon, Ariston was convicted of estafa. The Executive Secretary ordered the Director of Prisons to recommit Ariston to prison to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence.
Sales, stepdaughter of Ariston, filed an original petition for habeas corpus on behalf Ariston, who was then confined in the New Bilibid Prison, raising two principal contentions. Firstly, she argued that Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code had been repealed by Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. She contended, secondly, that Section 64 (i) was in any case repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution.
Sales, stepdaughter of Ariston, filed an original petition for habeas corpus on behalf Ariston, who was then confined in the New Bilibid Prison, raising two principal contentions. Firstly, she argued that Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code had been repealed by Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. She contended, secondly, that Section 64 (i) was in any case repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code had been repealed by Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code
2. Whether or not Section 64 (i) is repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution
2. Whether or not Section 64 (i) is repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution
Held:
1. The Revised Penal Code, which was approved on December 8, 1930, contains a repealing clause (article 367), which expressly repeals among other Acts sections 102, 2670, 2671, and 2672 of the Administrative Code. It does not repeal section 64 (i) above quoted.
The legislative intent is clear, therefore, to preserve the power of the President to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any person who violates the condition or conditions of his pardon notwithstanding the enactment of article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which was enacted subsequent to the Revised Penal Code, expressly preserved the authority conferred upon the President by Section 64. The Court also held that Article 159 and Section 64 (i) could stand together and that the proceeding under one provision did not necessarily preclude action under the other.
2. Since the petitioner was a convict "who had already been seized in a constitutional way, been confronted by his accusers and the witnesses against him, been convicted of crime and been sentenced to punishment therefor," he was not constitutionally entitled to another judicial determination of whether he had breached the condition of his parole by committing a subsequent offense. (Sales vs. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-3972. October 13, 1950)
1. The Revised Penal Code, which was approved on December 8, 1930, contains a repealing clause (article 367), which expressly repeals among other Acts sections 102, 2670, 2671, and 2672 of the Administrative Code. It does not repeal section 64 (i) above quoted.
The legislative intent is clear, therefore, to preserve the power of the President to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any person who violates the condition or conditions of his pardon notwithstanding the enactment of article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which was enacted subsequent to the Revised Penal Code, expressly preserved the authority conferred upon the President by Section 64. The Court also held that Article 159 and Section 64 (i) could stand together and that the proceeding under one provision did not necessarily preclude action under the other.
2. Since the petitioner was a convict "who had already been seized in a constitutional way, been confronted by his accusers and the witnesses against him, been convicted of crime and been sentenced to punishment therefor," he was not constitutionally entitled to another judicial determination of whether he had breached the condition of his parole by committing a subsequent offense. (Sales vs. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-3972. October 13, 1950)
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