Art. 23. Effect of Pardon by the Offended Party. — A pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action except as provided in article 344 of this Code; but civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is extinguished by his express waiver. (Revised Penal Code)

 What is the effect of pardon given by the offended party? Does it extinguish criminal action?

As a general rule, pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action. It is not one of the ground for extinction of criminal liability under Art. 89 of the RPC. Once a complaint has been filed in court, jurisdiction over the offense will be acquired and will continue to be exercised by the court until termination of the case.

However, civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is extinguished by his express waiver. (Art. 23, RPC)


 Why is there no extinction of criminal liability?

● A crime committed is an offense against the State. The aggrieved party is only a witness. Only the Chief Executive can pardon the offenders.

● A criminal act causes two (2) classes of injury. The first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated thru indemnity, which is civil in nature. (Presenes vs. People, G.R. No. 153845. September 11, 2003) The pardon given by the offended party would relate only to the civil liability and not the criminal aspect. 


Is there an exception to the rule? When will pardon by the offended party after the institution of criminal action extinguish the criminal liability?

● Yes. In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The benefit of marriage shall also be applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the abovementioned crimes. (Article 89, in relation to Article 344 and Article 266-C of the RPC as amended by R.A. 8353)

● In the case of People vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 185843, March 3, 2010, De Guzman had been convicted for two counts of rape and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each count. The conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court in March 2008. In August 2009, however, De Guzman and private complainant contracted marriage which was celebrated at the Bureau of Corrections. De Guzman filed a motion praying that he be absolved of his conviction for the two counts of rape and be released from imprisonment, pursuant to Article 266-C of the Revised Penal Code. The SC granted the motion:
Based on the documents, including copies of pictures taken after the ceremony and attached to the motion, we find the marriage between appellant and private complainant to have been contracted validly, legally, and in good faith, as an expression of their mutual love for each other and their desire to establish a family of their own. Given public policy considerations of respect for the sanctity of marriage and the highest regard for the solidarity of the family, we must accord appellant the full benefits of Article 89, in relation to Article 344 and Article 266-C of the RPC.

When must pardon be given to bar criminal prosecution of private crimes?

Pardon by the offended party will bar prosecution in the following crimes:

1. Concubinage
2. Adultery
3. Seduction
4. Abduction
5. Acts of Lasciviousness
6. Rape

Note: Rape is now a crime against persons

●  Pardon by the offended party to be effective must be given before the institution of criminal action. 

●  In order that the pardon of the aggrieved party may prevent the prosecution of the adulterers, it must be granted before and not after the penal action has been instituted. (People vs. Alicante, G.R. Nos. 127026-27. May 31, 2000)

● An affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as pardon in so-called "private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may possibly constitute evidence whose weight or probative value, like any other piece of evidence, would be up to the court for proper evaluation. (People vs. Alicante, G.R. Nos. 127026-27. May 31, 2000)


 Pardon for adultery and concubinage

In this jurisdiction pardon for adultery and concubinage must come before the institution of the criminal action and both offenders must be pardoned by the offended party if said pardon is to be effective. The pardon can be express or implied. Thus, when the offended party in writing or in an affidavit asserts that he or she is pardoning his or her erring spouse and paramour for their adulterous act this is a case of express pardon. There is implied pardon when the offended party continued to live with his spouse even after the commission of the offense. However such consent or pardon cannot be implied when the offended party allows his wife to continue living in the conjugal home after her arrest only in order to take care of their children. (Ligtas vs. CA, G.R. No. L-47498, May 7, 1987)


Pardon for seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape (S-A-A)

 The pardon in cases of seduction, abduction, or acts of lasciviousness must be express (in writing) and must be made before the institution of the action.


What is the effect of the grant of pardon by the parents of a minor?

The pardon by the parents, standing alone, is inefficacious.  The express pardon of a person guilty of attempted abduction of a minor, granted by the latter's parents, is not sufficient to remove criminal responsibility, but must be accompanied by the express pardon of the girl herself.

In the present case, the supposed pardon of the accused was allegedly granted only by the mother (BBB) without the concurrence of the offended minor, AAA.  Hence, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the initial desistance of the said mother from taking any action against the accused, constitutes pardon, it is clear that upon the authorities cited above, such pardon is ineffective without the express concurrence of the offended minor herself. (People vs. Tadulan, G.R. No. 117407. April 15, 1997)

Read: Pardon by the offended party vs. pardon by the President